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STUDENT NoES
Is no more likely to promote dangerous conduct again than is any
ordinarily prudent and mentally alert individual. Without observing
the subjective attitude of the offender towards his act and its conse-
quences, a distinction cannot be made between the intentional and the
negligent wrongdoing, making it equally as difficult to distinguish
between conduct justifying a conviction of murder and that justifying
a conviction of manslaughter. It is submitted that regardless of the
increasing inclination of the courts to place emphasis upon societal
harm rather than upon the subjective attitude of the offender, the
subjective attitude must continue to play an important role in the
formulation of a deflntion of criminal negligence.
3T. Wiar TUnRus, Ti.
THE CONTROL OF INFERIOR JURISDICTIONS BY THE KEN-
TUCKY COURT OF APPEALS
The superintending control over inferior tribunals possessed by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals is of ancient inception, and relates
back to and has its origin in the power exercised by the King's Bench
in England. It has been said that the exercise of this supervisory
power is recognized by the common law, apart from constitutional and
statutory provisions. However, in most of the recent cases which have
discussed the power eo nomine, its existence has been based on a con-
stitutional or statutory grant.
Thus, we find the Kentucky Court of Appeals receiving its power
by a constitutional grant which states, "The Court of Appeals shall
have power to issue such writs as may be necessary to give it a general
control of inferior jurisdictions."2
The writs which have been used by the court have been those of
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The use of the writ of prohibi-
tion greatly predominates.3 It would seem that the writ of mandamus
could not be granted in Kentucky, since the code states that the writ
of mandamus shall be granted by courts having original jurisdiction
and the Court of Appeals is one of appellate jurisdiction. However,
the court has stated in effect, that whenever the necessity for such
writ shall arise, the jurisdiction to grant it shall be theirs, as it was
before the adoption of the Civil Code.'
From time to time controversies have arisen as to whether the
Court of Appeals has such supervisory power and jurisdiction over
1 Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana. 18, 30 Am. Dee. 669 (Ky. 1837).
2Kentucky Constitution, Section 110 (1892).
$Rush v. Denhart, 138 Ky. 238, 127 S. W. 785 (1910); Patterson
v. Davis, 152 Ky. 530, 153 S. W. 780 (1913); Ohio River Contract Co. v.
Gordon, 170 Ky. 412, 186 S. W. 178 (1916); Smith v. Ward, 256 Ky. 213,
75 S. W. (2d) 538 (1934).
'Vance v. Field, 89 Ky. 178; 12 S. W. 190 (1889).
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various tribunals and boards. From such legal arguments have arisen
much settled law in regard thereto. By numerous decisions of the court
we can readily see that the Court of Appeals has general control over
circuit courts.' In one of the most recent cases on the question the
court stated, "The original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue
a writ of prohibition is conferred by section 110 of the Constitution,
which confers upon it the power to issue such writs as may be neces-
sary to give it a general control of inferior courts."' By other decisions
the Court of Appeals has been held to have a general control over a
county judge,7 a quarterly court,8 a city police judge,' and a justice of
the peace. Q
We find the court in numerous Instances denying its jurisdiction
over boards and commissions. In a late case the court said that it had
no authority, under its constitutional control over inferior tribunals, to
undertake to control the individual actions of a circuit judge, "but
only his official and judicial ones."" In another case the court denied a
writ of prohibition against the commissioner of a circuit court to pre-
vent him from enforcing a sale bond, saying that it had power to con-
trol only judicial tribunals, and that the commissioner was not a
judicial officer.'2 The court has refused to exercise its supervisory
power over the Governor of the State when he was doing an act of a
judicial nature." By another late case the court refused to issue a writ
of mandamus against the Workmen's Compensation Board where it
stated that "Inferior jurisdictions" meant inferior courts, and not
"administrative agencies."'" Likewise, a writ of mandamus was refused
against the Railroad Commission. 5
From the above one would naturally wonder just what circum-
stances would justify the exercise of the power. Where the party
seeking to invoke the exercise of the court's superintending control
has an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise in the court whose
power is invoked, the power will not be exercised, since the power will
be exercised only where there is no other adequate remedy, and the
court will strain itself to find another remedy.5 The Court of Appeals
5 Patterson v. Davis, 152 Ky. 530, 153 S. W. 780 (1913); Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Hardin, 166 Ky. 51, 178 S. W. 1155 (1915); Natural
Gas Products Co. v. Thurman, 205 Ky. 100, 265 S. W. 475 (1924);
Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501, 26 S. W. (2d) 43 (1930).
6 Smith v. Ward, 256 Ky. 13, 75 S. W. (2d) 538 (1934).
7 Rush v. Denhart, 138 Ky. 238, 127 S. W. 785 (1910).
$Illinois C. R. Co. v. Rice, 154 Ky. 198, 156 S. W. 1075 (1913).
'Prison Comrs. v. Crumbaugh, 161 Ky. 540, 170 S. W. 1187 (1914).
'1 Barth v. McCann, 123 Ky. 247, 94 S. W. 645 (1906).
nLedford v. Lewis, 238 Ky. 124, 36 S. W. (2d) 852 (1931).
"Morgan v. Clements, 153 Ky. 33, 154 S. W. 370 (1913).
2Holliday v. Fields, 207 Ky. 462, 269 S. W. 539 (1925).
:1 Maynard v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 210 Ky. 708, 276 S. W. 812
*(1925).
25Payne v. Kentucky R. Commission, 216 Ky. 188, 287 S. W. 560
(1926).
3"Tompkins v. Manning, 205 Ky. 327, 265 S. W. 830 (1924);
Osborn v. Wolford, 239 Ky. 47.0, 39 S. W. (2d) 672 (1931).
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has briefly In two cases given to us the instances when it will exercise
its power of control: 7
"We will prohibit inferior courts In all cases where (1) they
are threatening to proceed, or are proceeding, in a matter of which
they have no jurisdiction, and there is no remedy through an appli-
cation to an intermediate court; and (2) where they, although
possessing jurisdiction, are exercising or about to exercise it
erroneously, and great injustice and irreparable injury would
result to the applicant if they should do so and there exists no
other adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise."
The court stated in the second case, "that without the element of 'great
Injustice', 'great and irreparable injury', or some other expression
embodying the same idea, our original jurisdiction would not be exer-
cised." This statement was later upheld by the court when it denied
relief to one against a judgment rendered in a circuit court, although
there was no appeal from the judgment because of the small amount
involved, on the ground that no great and irreparable injury was
shown, although it was alleged that other similar suits were
threatened.u
The power of supervisory control is an extraordinary power. It is
hampered by no specific rules or means for its exercise. It is unlim,
ited, being bounded only by the exigencies which call for its exercise.
As new instances of these occur, the Court of Appeals will be found
able to cope with them. And if required, it is the writer's belief that
the Court of Appeals possesses the power to invent, frame, and formu-
late new and additional means, writs and processes whereby it may
exert its power of control over the Inferior courts in Kentucky.
CHARLES M. GADD.
'17Duffin v. Field, 208 Ky. 543, 271 S. W. 596 (1925); Litteral v.
Woods, 223 Ky. 582, 4 S. W. (2d) 395 (1928).
IsUnion Trading Co. v. Hubbard, 252 Ky. 518, 67 S. W. (2d) 693
(1934).
